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NOTE
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez: The U.S.
Supreme Court's Effort to Halt the Trade
in Illegal Drugs
I. Introduction
Perhaps in response to U.S. public sentiment concerning the in-
crease in the volume of illegal drugs smuggled into the United
States, the Supreme Court heard United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.I In
Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment's pro-
tections do not restrict U.S. officials when they conduct a "search
and seizure" of a nonresident alien's foreign home.2 Thus, the
Supreme Court's decision indicates that it too has joined the "war"
against drugs.
In 1982 the U.S. Congress analogized international drug smug-
glers to an invading army.3 This "invasion" led to a drastic increase,
in the United States, in the use of illegal narcotics. There was a cor-
responding increase in the various crimes connected to drug use and
the drug trade.4 Consequently, President Ronald Reagan declared a
war on drugs, specifically targeted at the primary sources of this
scourge-the international drug smugglers of Latin America. 5 The
Reagan administration's strategy in waging this war hinged upon the
mobilization of an "armed force" comprised of several U.S. law en-
forcement agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and the U.S. Customs
Service. 6 The efforts of these agencies were to be focused on the
common goal of winning this war on drugs.7
I 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
2 Id. at 1059.
3 HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL, ANNUAL REPORT:
PART 1, ACTIVITIES FOR THE YEAR 1981, H.R. REP. No. 418, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 1-2,
50 (1982).
4 Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception " to the Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS
L.J. 889, 894-95 (1987).
5 President's Radio Address to the Nation, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1249, 1249
(Oct. 2, 1982), quoted in Wisotsky, supra note 4, at 890.
6 Wisotsky, supra note 4, at 892. An example of a tool used to implement this strat-
egy is the administrative regulation enumerating the powers of the Director of the FBI. See
28 C.F.R. § 0.85 (1989).
7 Wisotsky, supra note 4, at 892.
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In addition to the "militarization" of these federal law enforce-
ment agencies, the Posse Comitatus Act,8 which represented the wall
separating civilian law enforcement from military law enforcement,
was amended to permit the federal government to enlist the aid of
the Armed Forces in the war on drugs.9 Consequently, as a supple-
ment to the radar balloons already launched by the civilian law en-
forcers in order to prevent a breach of the U.S. perimeter by drug
smugglers,' 0 the U.S. Department of Defense provided the federal
government with pursuit planes and helicopters, and the U.S. Navy
deployed E-2C "Hawkeye" radar planes and several patrol ships to
patrol the coastal skies and waters."
Despite this massive effort to end the drug incursion, drug
smuggling has grown into an industry that earns an estimated annual
profit of over $100 billion. 12 Faced with this seemingly uncontrolla-
ble international black market in narcotics, the U.S. public has be-
come angry, fearful, and frustrated. Verdugo-Urquidez may be the
Supreme Court's attempt to offer a solution to this problem.
In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court for the first time squarely ad-
dressed the issue of whether the constitutional protection against un-
reasonable searches and seizures, as provided in the Fourth
Amendment, applies to actions of U.S. agents with respect to prop-
erty that is owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign
country.' 3 The Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not ap-
ply to such searches, 14 and thus, by placing a judicial imprimatur on
criminal procedure measures that seemingly enlarge the powers of
U.S. agents acting abroad, contributed to the war effort on drugs.
This Note discusses the factual and legal background of Verdugo-
Urquidez. The Court's decision is also analyzed. Finally, the potential
ramifications and implications of this decision are examined.
II. Factual Background
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez 15 presented the Supreme Court
with a novel question: whether the Fourth Amendment protects a
nonresident alien from the actions of U.S. officials when such actions
8 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1988).
9 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-385 (1988). For example, § 372 provides: "The Secretary of
Defense may, in accordance with other applicable law, make available any equipment ....
base facility, or research facility of the Department of Defense to any Federal, State, or
local law enforcement official for law enforcement purposes." Id. § 372. See also Note,
Fourth Amendment and Posse Comitatus Act Restrictions on Military Involvement in Civil Law Em-
forcement, 54 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 404, 416-17 (1986).
10 Wisotsky, supra note 4, at 893.
11 Id. There was one instance where a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier interdicted and fired
upon a suspected drug smuggling ship. Id. at 893 n.24.
12 Id. at 893-94.
13 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1056.
14 Id.
15 Id.
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occur abroad. 16 In a six-to-three decision, 17 the Court held that the
Fourth Amendment does not protect foreign nationals from the ac-
tions of U.S. officials in foreign lands.'
Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez is a reputed international drug
smuggler, and since the late 1970s the DEA has been keeping tabs
on his activities.' 9 The DEA believes that he is one of the leaders of
a large Mexico-based narcotics organization involved in smuggling
large quantities of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana into the United
States. 20 Verdugo-Urquidez is believed also to have been a partici-
pant in the kidnap, torture, and murder of DEA agent Enrique
Camerena Salazar.2 1
Based on an informant's tip that Verdugo-Urquidez was plan-
ning to smuggle several tons of marijuana into the United States, on
August 3, 1985, the DEA filed a sealed complaint against Verdugo-
Urquidez charging him with various violations of U.S. criminal laws,
including (1) conspiracy to import multi-ton quantities of marijuana
into the United States, (2) possession with the intent to distribute
multi-ton quantities of marijuana, and (3) engaging in an ongoing
criminal enterprise. 22 Accordingly, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California issued an arrest warrant for
Verdugo-Urquidez.2 3 The DEA subsequently initiated a full scale in-
vestigation of Verdugo-Urquidez. 2 4 As a result of this investigation
the DEA was able to confirm, inter alia, that Verdugo-Urquidez re-
sided in Mexicali, Mexico and owned another house in San Felipe,
Mexico. 2 5
The DEA contacted the U.S. Marshals Service at the U.S.-Mexi-
can border in order to enquire as to the feasibility of enlisting the aid
of Mexican authorities to apprehend Verdugo-Urquidez in Mexico
and deliver him to the United States to face trial for the charges al-
leged in the complaint.2 6 In January 1986, after being alerted of the
situation by the Marshals Service, the Mexican Federal Judicial Police
(MFJP) agreed to apprehend Verdugo-Urquidez if there was an out-
16 Id.
17 Id. ChiefJustice Rehnquist delivered the Court's opinion, in which he was joined
by Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. Justice Kennedy also filed a separate
concurrence, as did Justice Stevens. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dis-
sented. Justice Blackmun filed a separate dissent. Id.
18 Id.
19 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1215 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd,
110 S. Ct. 1056, reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 1839, vacated, 902 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1990).
20 Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1215.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 1215-16.
23 Id. at 1216.
24 Id. The DEA attempted, but failed, to arrest Verdugo-Urquidez during one of his
frequent visits to the United States. Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
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standing U.S. warrant for his arrest. 27 The arrest warrant was shown
to the MFJP who subsequently apprehended Verdugo-Urquidez 28
and delivered him to the Border Patrol station in Calexico, Califor-
nia. 29 There, the Marshals Service placed him under arrest and then
contacted the DEA's resident agent in Calexico, Terry Bowen.30 The
DEA took custody of Verdugo-Urquidez and transported him to a
federal jail in San Diego, California, to await trial.3 ' After Verdugo-
Urquidez's arrest, Bowen decided that a search of Verdugo-
Urquidez's homes in Mexico would be fruitful. He contacted the As-
sistant Special Agent in Charge of DEA operations in Mexico, Walter
White, for an approval of the search.3 2 White contacted Mexican au-
thorities, who approved the search and offered their assistance. 33
On January 25, 1986, upon receiving White's approval, Bowen
and four other DEA agents, accompanied by several MFJP officers,
searched Verdugo-Urquidez's Mexicali and San Felipe residences.3 4
These searches yielded evidence which was to be used against
Verdugo-Urquidez in his U.S. trial, including a tally sheet noting the
quantities of marijuana smuggled into the United States.3 5
In the district court in San Diego, California, Verdugo-
Urquidez's motion to supress this evidence based on the Fourth
Amendment was granted.3 6 The Government unsuccessfully ap-
pealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
3 7
Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted the Government's appli-
27 Id.
28 Id. The details of Verdugo-Urquidez's apprehension by the MFJP are noteworthy:
On January 24, 1986, while driving his car in San Felipe, . . . Verdugo-
Urquidez was stopped by six Mexican police officers.... Verdugo-Urquidez
was ordered from his car, arrested, handcuffed and placed in the back seat of
the Mexican officers' unmarked car. With his hands still cuffed behind his
back, the police forced Verdugo-Urquidez to lie face down on the car
seat.... For most of the two-hour ride to the Mexican-American border,
[he] either lay on the seat covered with his jacket or lay there blindfolded. At
no time did the Mexican police officers explain to Verdugo-Urquidez where
they were going or why he had been arrested.
Id.
29 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1057.
30 Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1216.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 1226. Neither White nor Bowen sought a search warrant from a U.S. magis-
trate. In addition, the U.S. Department of Justice, which supervises the DEA, was not
contacted; nor was a U.S. Attorney's office contacted. Id. at 1216 n.2.
34 Id. at 1216-17. The DEA, led by Bowen, essentially conducted the search. The
MFJP played a minor role. For example, while they aided the DEA in searching the homes,
they asked Bowen what items were relevant enough to seize. Id. at 1227.
35 Id. at 1217.
36 Id. The district court granted Verdugo-Urquidez's motion to suppress at a hear-
ing, the proceedings of which are unpublished.
37 Id. at 1215. The Ninth Circuit upheld the motion, reasoning that it is generally
assumed that the Fourth Amendment constrains the U.S. government in its pursuit of ex-
traterritorial law enforcement. Hence in this case, because the DEA supervised and con-
ducted the searches and seizures at Verdugo-Urquidez's homes, and because there existed
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cation for certiorari.38
HI. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit,
and held that the Fourth Amendment "does not apply to the search
and seizure by United States agents of property owned by a nonresi-
dent alien and located in a foreign country."3 9 Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, writing for the majority, based his analysis on several
arguments.
A. The Function of the Fourth Amendment
First, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the function of the
Fourth Amendment is such that violations of its provisions occur
prior to a trial. 40 Hence, such questionable governmental actions do
not impair a criminal defendant's rights to procedural fairness at a
trial.4 ' This function contrasts with the function of, for example, the
Fifth Amendment, 42 which is "a fundamental trial right of criminal
defendants." 43 Therefore, the Court reasoned, "[f]or the purposes
of this case ... if there were a constitutional violation, it occurred
solely in Mexico. Whether evidence obtained from respondent's
Mexican residences should be excluded at trial in the United States is
a remedial question separate from the existence [or not] of the con-
stitutional violation."'44 Having thus delineated the function of the
Fourth Amendment, Chief Justice Rehnquist proceeded to analyze
the scope of the Fourth Amendment.
no exigent circumstances, the DEA's conduct was constitutionally improper absent a war-
rant. Id. at 1229-30.
38 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 109 S. Ct. 1741 (1989).
39 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1057.
40 Id. at 1060.
41 Id. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
42 The Fifth Amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases aris-
ing in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time
of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
43 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1060. The Court conceded that "conduct by law
enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately impair [the Fifth Amendment] right."
Id.
44 Id.
1990] 515
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B. Only "the People" are Protected
The Court reasoned that Verdugo-Urquidez is not protected by
the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment because he is not one of
"the People" for whom these protections were drafted.45 The Chief
Justice based this reasoning on the fact that the text of the Fourth
Amendment is addressed to "the People,"146 whereas the textual ref-
erences to individuals in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are to
"person" and "accused" respectively. 47 The Court argued that the
words "the People" suggest a term of art employed by the Framers
only in select portions of the Constitution to identify the specific
class of people protected by those select portions.48 Those pro-
tected by these select provisions comprise "a class of people who are
part of a national community or who have otherwise developed suffi-
cient connections with this country to be considered part of that
community." 49
In this case Verdugo-Urquidez is a Mexican national who is le-
gally but involuntarily in the United States. He has not, according to
the Court, "otherwise develop[ed] sufficient connections with this
country to be considered part of the community."50 That is,
Verdugo-Urquidez is not one of "the People" referred to in the
Fourth Amendment; consequently he is not entitled to its
protections.
C. The Compact Theory
ChiefJustice Rehnquist then proffered a variation of the preced-
ing argument as another analytical tool to explain why it is proper to
limit the extraterritorial reaches of the Fourth Amendment's protec-
tions. The Chief Justice argued that it is apparent from historical
data that the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect only the
people of the United States from arbitrary action by the federal gov-
ernment-these protections were never intended to protect aliens
from the actions of the federal government outside the territorial
boundaries of the United States. 5'
This argument, seemingly, is based on two theories: (1) the the-
ory that the Constitution is a compact between the governed and the
government in the United States; and (2) the territorial theory that
the provisions of the Constitution do not apply outside the territorial
boundaries of the United States to restrain the actions of the federal
45 Id.
46 Id. at 1061 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
47 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amends. V & VI).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
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government. First, the compact theory holds that the people of the
United States agreed with the Framers of the Constitution to be gov-
erned by the federal government in exchange for the protections
guaranteed by the Constitution. The Constitution also serves as a
check on the actions of the government. 52
Second, the Chief Justice argued that the Fourth Amendment
was intended only to restrain the actions of the U.S. government oc-
curring within the United States.53 This argument is seemingly
based on the territorial principle of international law that teaches
that "a [nation] occupies a definite part of the surface of the earth,
within which it normally exercises, subject to the limitations imposed
by international law, jurisdiction over persons and things to the ex-
clusion of the jurisdiction of other states."'54 The Court's reasoning
is that if a U.S. official acts within another country, that country's
laws apply with respect to that act to the exclusion of the laws of the
United States. Therefore, because the searches and seizures of
Verdugo-Urquidez's homes occurred in Mexico, the application of
U.S. law was preempted by the laws of Mexico, which have no direct
analogue to the Fourth Amendment. This is so despite the fact that
Verdugo-Urquidez was facing trial in the United States.
D. Fourth Amendment Precedent
The Court also found support for its holding by examining
some of its prior decisions. Although no cases have addressed the
question raised in Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court was able to draw some
conclusions by analyzing certain cases that are factually akin to
Verdugo-Urquidez. ChiefJustice Rehnquist commenced with an exami-
nation of the Insular Cases.55 This is a group of Supreme Court cases
decided between 1901 and 1922, "which held that not every consti-
tutional provision applies to governmental activity [in territories]
where the United States has sovereign power."' 56 The Court found
that the unequivocal language in these cases limiting the effect of the
Constitution's protections in U.S. territories, undermined Verdugo-
Urquidez's argument to extend the Fourth Amendment to aliens in
foreign nations.5 7
Similarly, the Chief Justice supported his analysis by citing a
52 See Saltzburg, The Reach of the Bill of Rights Beyond the Terra Firma of the United States,
20 VA. J. INT'L L. 741, 745 (1980); Note, The Extraterritorial Application of the Constitution-
Unalienable Rights?, 72 VA. L. REV. 649, 653 (1986).
53 Verdugo.Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1061.
54 J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 162 (1963).
55 Verdugo-Urguidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1062 (citing Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298
(1922); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138
(1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)).
56 Id. See, e.g., Balzac, 258 U.S. 298, 309 (1922) (holding that the Fifth Amendment
right to a jury was inapplicable in Puerto Rico).
57 Verdugo.Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1063.
1990]
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case in which aliens who were arrested outside the United States
were denied the protections of the Fifth Amendment. 58 The Verdugo-
Urquidez Court reasoned that if the Fifth Amendment, which is ad-
dressed to a broad class (i.e., "person"), cannot be extended beyond
U.S. boundaries, it would be illogical to extend the Fourth Amend-
ment, which addresses a limited class (i.e., "the people"), beyond the
citizenry of the United States.59
The Court discredited Verdugo-Urquidez's reliance on Reid v.
Covert.60 In Covert the Supreme Court held that a U.S. serviceman's
wife who was to be tried for a capital crime before a U.S. military
tribunal in England was entitled to the protections of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments. 6' The Chief Justice noted that Verdugo-
Urquidez's reliance on Covert is misplaced because, unlike the de-
fendant in Covert, he is not a U.S. citizen. 62
The Court also distinguished other cases in which constitutional
protections had been extended to aliens. 63 ChiefJustice Rehnquist,
again noting that Verdugo-Urquidez was a nonresident alien who
was involuntarily in the United States, argued that the reason the
aliens in cases such as Plyler v. Doe64 and Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding65
were found to be entitled to certain constitutional protections was
that these aliens had "come within the territory of the United States
and developed substantial connections with this country."' 66 The
Court noted that Verdugo-Urquidez had "no previous significant
voluntary connection" with the United States, and that his lawful but
58 Id. (citingJohnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950)).
59 Id. The Court asserted that "[i]f such is true of the Fifth Amendment, which
speaks in the relatively universal term of 'person,' it would seem even more true with
respect to the Fourth Amendment, which applies to 'the people.' " Id.
60 Id. (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)).
61 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957).
62 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1063.
63 Id. at 1064.
64 457 U.S. 202 (1982). In Plyler, a Texas statute denied to "undocumented" school-
age children the free public education which the state provided to children who were U.S.
citizens or legally admitted aliens. Id. at 205. The Supreme Court held that the statute
violated the equal protection clause. d. at 230.
65 344 U.S. 590 (1953). In Kwong Hai Chew, a Chinese seaman married a U.S. citizen.
d. at 592. He was granted permanent U.S. resident status. d. at 592-93. The Coast
Guard approved Kwong Hai Chew for employment on a merchant ship. Id. at 594. After
working on a ship that traveled to several foreign countries, Kwong Hai Chew was not
permitted to disembark in the U.S. Id. at 594-95. He was detained on Ellis Island without
notice of the charges and "without opportunity to be heard in opposition thereto." Id. at
595. The Supreme Court held that the detention violated 8 C.F.R. § 175.57(b) (1947)
which provided:
In the case of an alien temporarily excluded by an official of the Depart-
ment ofJustice on the ground that he is, or may be excludable under one or
more of the categories set forth in § 175.53, no hearing by a board of special
inquiry shall be held until after the case is reported to the Attorney General
and such a hearing is directed by the Attorney General or his representative.
Id. at 596.
66 Id. (citing Plyler, 457 U.S. at 212; Kwong Hai Chew, 344 U.S. at 596 n.5).
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involuntary presence in the country is insufficient to indicate any
"substantial connection" with the United States. 67 Furthermore, in
none of the cases cited was the application of the Fourth Amendment
to an alien at issue.
The Chief Justice then explained that the Ninth Circuit's reli-
ance on the Supreme Court's decision in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza 68 was
misplaced. 69 In Lopez-Mendoza, the Court was faced with the narrow
question of whether the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule
should be extended to civil deportation proceedings. 70 In analyzing
this question, a majority of the Justices in Lopez-Mendoza assumed
that the Fourth Amendment applied to illegal aliens in the United
States. 71 But as Justice Rehnquist pointed out in Verdugo-Urquidez,
"such assumptions ... are not binding in future cases that directly
raise the questions ... [and] are therefore not dispositive of how the
Court would rule on a Fourth Amendment claim by illegal aliens in
the United States if such a claim were squarely before us." 72
Finally, the Court endorsed its prior decisions holding that the
discriminatory treatment of aliens with respect to the Fourth Amend-
ment did not violate the equal protection clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 73
E. Public Policy
In the final portion of its analysis the Court highlighted some of
the adverse consequences that are likely to arise from an extension
of the Fourth Amendment to restrict the actions of U.S. officials
abroad. 74 The Court asserted that the federal government's ability
to respond to various situations involving U.S. interests, which might
result in searches and seizures, would be unduly limited if the Fourth
Amendment applied to U.S. operations abroad.75 The federal gov-
ernment might also be the target of the "offensive" use of the Fourth
Amendment by aliens-that is, as the Court warned, "aliens with no
attachment to this country might well bring actions for damages to
remedy claimed violations of the Fourth Amendment in foreign
countries." 76 Even if many or all of such claims were invalid, the
67 Id.
68 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
69 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1064.
70 Id. (citing Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1034-35).
71 Id. (citing Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1045 (noting INS's procedure for investigat-
ing and punishing immigration officers who commit Fourth Amendment violations)).
72 Id. at 1065.
73 Id. (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298
(1922); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138
(1904); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950)).
74 Id. at 1065-66.
75 Id. at 1065.
76 Id.
19901
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Court would have to undertake a case-by-case analysis to determine
the validity of each claim.77 Thus, the Supreme Court concluded
that it would not place restrictions on searches and seizures which
occur incident to U.S. action abroad.78 The Court deferred the im-
position of such restrictions to the political branches. 79
F. The Concurring Opinions
Justice Kennedy, in a separate concurrence, agreed with the fun-
damental underpinnings of the Chief Justice's opinion; however, he
disagreed with two points in the Court's analysis.80 He also sug-
gested a two-pronged inquiry to analyze cases presenting questions
similar to those raised in Verdugo-Urquidez.8 First, Justice Kennedy
found fault in the Court's reliance on the "compact" theory as an
analytical tool for resolving the Verdugo-Urquidez issue.82 He noted
that although the Constitution and general principles of law do not
create "any juridical relation between [the United States] and some
undefined, limitless class of non-citizens who are beyond our terri-
tory," s83 whether this relation exists is irrelevant with respect to the
question of the powers or limitations on the federal government as
defined in the Constitution.8 4 That is, "[tihe force of the Constitu-
tion is not confined because it was brought into being by certain per-
sons who gave their immediate assent to its terms." 85
In the second instance, Justice Kennedy similarly disputed the
Court's utilization of the theory that only "the people" of the United
States are protected. He stated that " 'the right of the people' to
Fourth Amendment protection may be interpreted to underscore the
importance of the right, rather than to restrict the category of per-
sons who may assert it."86 Neither the force nor the reach of the
Fourth Amendment is reduced because the words "the People" were
used.8 7
Justice Kennedy then proposed a two-pronged test to be used in
analyzing issues such as the one raised in Verdugo-Urquidez. First, not-
ing that the U.S. government may act only as authorized by the Con-
stitution, the inquiry is whether the federal government has acted
77 Id.
78 Id. at 1066.
79 Id. The Court stated that these restrictions may be imposed through "diplomatic
understanding, treaty, or legislation." Id.
80 Id. at 1066-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
81 Id. at 1067 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
82 Id. at 1066 (Kennedy, J, concurring).
83 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
84 Id. at 1067 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
85 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
86 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
87 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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within its Constitutional mandate.88 If the answer to this question is
"no," then that is presumably the end of the inquiry because such
conduct should be deemed clearly unconstitutional.8 9 Second, if the
answer to the first question is "yes," then the inquiry is "what consti-
tutional standards apply when the Government acts, in reference to
an alien, within its sphere of operations." 90 Justice Kennedy as-
serted that these questions must be considered in light of the fact
that when the United States acts to assert its legitimate power and
authority abroad there are considerations and conditions that may
make adherence to some constitutional guarantees impracticable and
anomalous. 9 1 Applying this test to Verdugo-Urquidez, Justice Kennedy
reasoned that because the Fourth Amendment's warrant require-
ment may have been inconsistent with the traditions and institutions
of Mexico, because the DEA needed to cooperate with the MFJP, and
because the search warrant would have been a "dead letter" in Mex-
ico, adherence to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement
would have been impracticable. 92 Justice Kennedy explained that
Mexico has different and perhaps unascertainable conceptions of
reasonableness and privacy, and this inherent cultural difference is
compounded by the fact that there are not local judges or magis-
trates to issue the warrant. 93 Because of these factors, the Fourth
Amendment's requirements should not apply in Mexico as it does
here.
Similarly, Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, found the Court's
historical discourse interesting but irrelevant.9 4 Justice Stevens
wrote separately because he found the Chief Justice's opinion too
sweeping. Justice Stevens opined that " 'those people' who are enti-
tled to the protection of the Bill of Rights including the Fourth
Amendment" include Verdugo-Urquidez and all other aliens who
are lawfully present in the United States. 95 However, Justice Stevens
found that the searches of Verdugo-Urquidez's homes in Mexico
were not unreasonable. 96 In addition, he reasoned that the warrant
requirement was inapplicable in this case because U.S. magistrates
88 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
89 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy did not articulate an option if the
answer to this inquiry is "no," so this response is inferred.
90 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan,
J., concurring)).
91 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Reid, 354 U.S. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
92 Id. at 1068 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
93 Id. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence requires that a warrant be issued from a
"neutral and detached" magistrate who decides independently, but based on a police re-
port, whether to issue a warrant. Theoretically, this magistrate serves as a check on the
potential abuses of overzealous law enforcement agents. See Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1947)).
94 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1068 (Stevens, J., concurring).
95 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
96 Id. (Stevens,J., concurring).
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are not empowered to authorize searches of a nonresident alien's
home in a foreign jurisdiction. 97
As discussed above, the issue faced by the Supreme Court in
Verdugo-Urquidez was one of first impression. It therefore is useful to
examine briefly Fourth Amendment jurisprudence with respect to
the search of an individual's home. Cases that may have aided the
Court in its analysis are also examined.
It is generally recognized in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence
that the natural rights theory of man is the philosophical basis of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. 98 This theory suggests that an
individual's right of personal liberty is inherent, natural, and inalien-
able. Blackstone's conception of individual rights greatly influenced
the Framers: "By absolute rights of individuals we mean those which
are so in their primary and strictest sense; such as would belong to
their persons merely in a state of nature, and which every man is
entitled to enjoy, whether out of society or in it." 99
Reading the Fourth Amendment in light of its recognized foun-
dation, it is apparent that the Fourth Amendment as well as the other
provisions of the Bill of Rights were drafted to protect individuals,
including those suspected of crimes, from arbitrary actions by the
federal government. In underscoring the protections guaranteed by
the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, Professor Saltzburg ob-
served that "[m]uch of the Bill of Rights is devoted to providing safe-
guards to protect those suspected of, or charged with, crimes."' 00
Specifically, considering the basis and text of the Fourth Amend-
ment, the Supreme Court has held that this amendment contem-
plates that individuals have reasonable expectations of privacy with
respect to their persons, houses, papers, and effects, and thus are
protected from "certain kinds of governmental intrusion."''
97 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens' reading of the warrant requirement is
too restrictive and technical. It fails to acknowledge that the requirement is designed not
merely as a method for judges and magistrates to authorize searches, but also a means to
inject the objectivity of a "neutral and detached" magistrate into the criminal investigatory
process to ensure that law enforcement agents do not overstep their constitutional
bounds. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966).
Justice Brennan's dissent is instructive on the potential effects of holding that the
warrant requirement is inapplicable in foreign lands. Justice Brennan equates such war-
rantless searches with the government acting above the law, and he is concerned that it will
breed contempt for the law: "This principle is no different when the United States applies
its rules of conduct to foreign nationals. If we seek respect for law and order, we. must
observe these principles ourselves. Lawlessness breeds lawlessness." Verdugo-Urquidez,
110 S. Ct. at 1071 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
98 See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1219 (9th Cir. 1988);
Henkin, Rights Here and There, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1582, 1582 (1981); Note, supra note 52, at
651; 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 200 (1971).
99 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *123 (emphasis in original).
100 Saltzburg, supra note 53, at 743.
101 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967). Without an explicit definition, the
Katz Court implies that the prohibited intrusions are unreasonable searches and seizures,
which encompass warrantless intrusions. Id.
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Although the Fourth Amendment does not provide a general right to
privacy, "what [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionlly protected."' 1 2 Hav-
ing thus noted the basis and the text of the Fourth Amendment's
protections, the question then becomes: Which individuals are enti-
tled to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects from
unreasonable searches and seizures by the federal government?
One of the basic tenets of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is
that, absent one of the few "specifically established and well deline-
ated" exceptions,103 warrantless searches (i.e., those conducted with-
out prior judicial approval) are per se unreasonable. 10 4 This
principle was followed by the Supreme Court in Mincey v. Arizona. 10 5
In that case, the police conducted a narcotics raid on the suspect's
apartment. 10 6 There was an exchange of gunfire, which resulted in
the death of an undercover police officer, and the wounding of the
suspect and two other persons in the apartment. 10 7 Shortly after the
dead and wounded were removed to the hospital, the police, without
securing a search warrant, proceeded to conduct a four-day search of
the suspect's apartment.' 08 Many of the items seized during this
search were introduced at Mincey's trial in the state court. 10 9 The
Arizona Supreme Court upheld the warrantless search, arguing that
the search of a homicide scene is an exception to the warrant re-
quirement.110 The Supreme Court held that the Arizona Supreme
Court had impermissibly created a "murder scene exception" to the
warrant requirement, and reversed the Arizona court's decision.II
The Court reasoned that, because all of the apartment's occupants
had been located and removed before the officers who conducted the
search arrived at the scene, any exigent circumstances which may
have excused the warrant requirement had been eradicated. 12 The
Mincey Court emphasized that the protections of the Fourth Amend-
102 Id. at 351-52.
103 Saltzburg, supra note 52, at 743.
104 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978).
105 d.
106 Id. at 387.
107 Id. at 387-88.
108 Id. at 389.
109 Id.
1lO Id.
I ld. at 395. The Court further stated:
[A] warrantless search must be 'strictly circumscribed by the exigencies
which justify its initiation' . . . and it simply cannot be contended that this
search was justified by an emergency .... All the persons in Mincey's apart-
ment had been located before the investigating homicide officers arrived
there and began their search. And a four-day search that included opening
dresser drawers and ripping up carpets can hardly be rationalized in terms of
the legitimate concerns that justify an emergency search.
d. at 393.
112 Id.
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ment, especially with respect to an individual's home, cannot be sac-
rificed for the benefit of more efficient law enforcement:
[T]he mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient
can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment....
The investigation of crime would always be simplified if warrants
were unnecessary. But the Fourth Amendment reflects the view of
those who wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person's
home and property may not be totally sacrificed in the name of max-
imum simplicity in enforcement of the criminal law.' 11
As the Mincey court stressed, a warrant is generally required to
search an individual's home unless " 'the exigencies of the situation'
make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrant-
less search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment." 114 These exigencies include the search of an arrested
suspect and the area within his control for weapons and evidence,' 15
a search when an officer is in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect, 1 6 and
a search brought on by the danger of imminent destruction of
evidence. 117
In addition to the exceptions listed above, at least one federal
court has recognized that the protections of the Fourth Amendment
may be relaxed when there is a search by federal officials to "inspect
public documents or records required to be kept where regulated
business is being conducted."" 8 This was the exception used in
Peeples v. United States. 119 In that case, the defendant appealed a con-
viction for carrying on a business of retail liquor dealing and for will-
fully failing to pay a special tax, arguing that the evidence introduced
at his trial must be suppressed because it had been obtained by inter-
nal revenue agents after entering the "curtilage" of his home without
a warrant. 120 The Fifth Circuit concluded that "[i]nspection of
places of regulated business ...does not require compliance with
the same standards of conduct generally imposed on law enforce-
ment officials by the Fourth Amendment."' 12 1 The Peeples court thus
applied this "exception" to the defendant's circumstances and ex-
cused the warrant requirement, although the place searched was
Peeples' home. 122
Mincey and Peeples, and the cases cited therein, provide an over-
113 Id.
114 Id. at 394.
115 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 (1969).
116 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967).
117 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966).
118 Peeples v. United States, 341 F.2d 60, 64 (5th Cir. 1965).
119 Id. at 62. The Fifth Circuit noted that the only evidence that the Government
sought to introduce consisted of testimony by three Internal Revenue Service agents indi-
cating their actions at the search, and the defendant's tax history. Id.
120 Id. at 63.
121 Id. at 64.
122 Id. at 65.
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view of how U.S. courts generally analyze the issue of whether the
government's warrantless search of a U.S. resident's home in the
United States has violated the Fourth Amendment. In order to prop-
erly analyze the more difficult issue raised in Verdugo-Urquidez, the
precepts of Mincey and Peeples should be considered in conjunction
with the cases discussed below, which address the extraterritorial ap-
plication of the other criminal procedure components of the Bill of
Rights.
In 1956 the Supreme Court decided, in Reid v. Covert, 123 that
when the U.S. government acts against its citizens abroad it can do
so only within the restrictions imposed by the Constitution. 24 In
that case, Clarice Covert, a U.S. citizen, was facing trial before a U.S.
military tribunal in England for the murder of her husband who was
a sergeant in the U.S. Air Force. 125 While awaiting the pending
court-martial in a U.S. jail, Covert petitioned a district court for a
writ of habeas corpus, arguing that she was entitled to a civilian trial
because she was a civilian.' 26 The district court agreed with Covert.
Nevertheless, upon review the Supreme Court held that the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments did not protect U.S. citizens when they were tried
by the U.S. government in foreign countries for offenses committed
in a foreign country.127 The Court subsequently granted a rehearing
and reversed its earlier decision, stating:
[W]e reject the idea that when the United States acts against its citi-
zens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights. The United States
is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority
have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the limi-
tations imposed by the Constitution. When the Government
reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the
Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect
his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because he hap-
pens to be in another land. 128
In light of this generally accepted principle, the question that arises
in the context of Verdugo-Urquidez is whether the U.S. government is
similarly restricted when acting towards aliens in a foreign land.
Certain cases have extended to aliens within the United States
certain constitutional provisions. 129 There are, however, only a lim-
ited number of cases where the question of the extraterritorial appli-
123 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
124 Id. The Court stated that these limitations include those imposed by the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments. Id.
125 Id. at 3.
126 Id. at 4.
127 Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487, 488 (1956) (applying reservation expressed in Kin-
sella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 481-85 (1956)).
128 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957).
129 See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 152, 156 (1945) (reversing a deportation
order in which "incompetent" evidence was heard and considered, resulting in an unfair
hearing); Yick Wo v. United States, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (holding that the 14th
Amendment applies with respect to aliens present in the United States).
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cation of the Bill of Rights to aliens has been considered. The one
that is most germane to Verdugo-Urquidez is United States v. Tiede.'1 0 In
Tiede, the United States Court for Berlin was confronted with the is-
sue of whether a German national facing a criminal proceeding for
diverting an aircraft from its scheduled landing was entitled to the
Sixth Amendment's protections.' 3 ' In holding that Tiede was enti-
tled to a jury trial as provided by the Sixth Amendment, the court
echoed the Covert Court when it stated: "It is a first principle of
American life-not only at home but life abroad-that everything
American public officials-do is governed by, measured against, and
must be authorized by the United Stat~s Constitution."'' 32 Based on
the principles announced in Covert and Tiede, the actions of the DEA
agents as U.S. government officials in Verdugo-Urquidez, seemingly,
should be subject to constitutional limitations.
IV. Analysis
In Verdugo-Urquidez, a majority of the Supreme Court unequivo-
cally mandated that the safeguards provided by the Fourth Amend-
ment do not apply to an alien when that alien is subjected to U.S.
government actions that occur outside U.S. territory. 33 Thus, the
Court has implicitly mandated that aliens abroad must abide by U.S.
laws that have an extraterritorial reach; but if while abroad an alien is
accused of committing an act that violates any of these laws and the
individual is brought to trial in the United States, that alien is not
entitled to the same protections accorded persons within the United
States who violate the same or similar laws.1 s4 As Professor
Saltzburg observed: "Although there is no way to prove the Fram-
ers' intent, it is odd to conclude that they wanted U.S. power to be
exerted in foreign nations, if possible, without enforcing the consti-
tutional limitations on that power."' 3 5
The Court rationalized this decision by asserting that aliens who
face criminal proceedings in the United States are not deprived of
their opportunity for a fair trial because they are entitled to the pro-
tection of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, which together ensure
the right to a fair trial by a jury.136 These two amendments contrast
with the Fourth Amendment, which functions to protect only "the
People" of the United States from arbitrary governmental action
ISO 86 F.R.D. 227 (1979).
131 Id. at 244-45.
132 Id. at 244.
133 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1056.
134 Id. at 1069-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.).
135 Saltzburg, supra note 52, at 747 n.29.
136 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1060-61; see also supra notes 40-44 and accompanying
text.
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before trial. '3 7
This interpretation of the Bill of Rights emasculates the criminal
procedure component of the Bill of Rights with respect to aliens.
The Fourth Amendment does not exist in a vacuum. By reading this
provision in isolation, rather than in light of and in conjunction with
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, the Court gives aliens a right to a
fair trial by conceding the applicabilty of the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments, while in the same motion effectively taking this right away. A
trial is not "fair" when the Government is permitted to introduce any
evidence against a defendant alien, irrespective of how it was
obtained.
The Fourth Amendment's pretrial safeguards are necessary to
render the Fifth and Sixth Amendment fair trial guarantees meaning-
ful. Just as "a right to life.., would be hollow without a correspond-
ing right to liberty,"'138 the right to a fair trial would be hollow
without a corresponding right to exclude illegally obtained evidence
from that trial. As the Ninth Circuit panel that upheld Verdugo-
Urquidez's motion stated: "It would be odd indeed to acknowledge
that Verdugo-Urquidez is entitled to due process under the [F]ifth
[A]mendment and to a fair trial under the [S]ixth [A]mendment,
both of which . . . he is accorded under established constitutional
jurisprudence, and deny him the protection from unreasonable
searches and seizures . . . under the [F]ourth [A]mendment."' 3 9
The" Court's analysis of the scope of the Fourth Amendment be-
gan with a discussion of the relevance of the use of the words "the
People" in the text of the Fourth Amendment.' 40 This language,
according to the Court, limits the class of those protected to the citi-
zens of the United States and those aliens who have established such
"substantial connections"'1 41 with the United States so as to have be-
come part of the community.' 42
In addition to Justice Kennedy's criticism of the "the People"
and compact arguments, 43 this argument fails to address the fact
that Verdugo-Urquidez effectively became one of "the People"
1357 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1060-61; see also supra notes 40-44 and accompanying
text.
138 Note, supra note 52, at 652.
'39 Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1224.
'140 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1060.
141 The Court neither defines this term in the opinion nor lists a set of criteria or
examples that can be used to determine whether an alien has established a "substantial
connection" with the United States.
142 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1061.
143 Id. at 1066-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy found fault with the
"the People" argument because he found that "the People['s]" right to be protected by
the Fourth Amendment underscores the importance of that right-it does not serve to
restrict the category of persons who may assert that right. Id. at 1067 (Kennedy, J., con-
curring). Moreover, whether the Constitution or general principles of law create a "com-
pact" between the United States and noncitizens is irrelevant with respect to the power of
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when he was brought here to stand trial. By bringing Verdugo-
Urquidez into the United States to answer for the crimes alleged in
the complaint, the government provided this alien with the "substan-
tial connections" discussed by Chief Justice Rehnquist in his opin-
ion. It is undisputed that being held in custody does not in itself
establish residency. However, when an alien is brought to the
United States to stand trial as Verdugo-Urquidez was, that alien has
been subjected to being governed by the U.S. government, hence he
should be accorded those protections under the Bill of Rights, inm
cluding those of the Fourth Amendment, that will ensure his fair
treatment as one of "the People."
The Fourth Amendment protects reasonable expectations of
privacy. Based on the Court's "compact" analysis the only protected
privacy expectations under the Fourth Amendment are those of "the
People" of the United States. This notion can be supported by the
rationale that Mexican citizens also have a reasonable expectation,
based on a comparable "compact" with their government, that their
privacy will be invaded only when Mexican-not U.S.-law permits.
Thus, there is no warrant requirement under Mexican law so one
should not be "added" when U.S. agents act, with the authority of
the MFJP, in Mexico against a Mexican citizen. At the heart of the
issue, however, is whether Mexicans or other foreign nationals
should have to live their lives wary of the fact that they are subject to
the extraterritorial reach of U.S. criminal laws but are not entitled to
the same protection afforded criminally accused persons with "suffi-
cient connections" to the U.S. to be considered one of "the People."
As Justice Brennan observed in his dissent:
The majority today brushes aside the principles of mutuality and
fundamental fairness that are central to our Nation's Constitutional
conscience. The Court articulated a "sufficient connection" test but
then refuses to discuss the underlying principles upon which any in-
terpretation of that test must rest. . . . [B]y placing [Verdugo-
Urquidez] among those governed by federal criminal laws and inves-
tigating him for violations of those laws, the [g]overnment has made
him part of our community for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment. 144
By relying on the argument that the Constitution is a compact
between the U.S. government and its citizens (i.e., those who as-
sented to the Constitution's ratification), the Chief Justice overlooks
the fact that the Constitution has its foundation in the belief that all
individuals have certain inherent natural or human rights.14 5 The
compact theory "takes a metaphor useful for describing the Framers'
view of the proper basis for the creation of government, and at-
limitations on the U.S. government as enumerated in the Constitution. Id. at 1066 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring).
144 Id. at 1072 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
145 See generally I B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 98.
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tempts to use it as a rigid rule for limiting constitutional protec-
tions." 46  Such a restrictive reading of the Constitution is
inconsistent with the theory of individual rights which is at the heart
of U.S. polity, 14 7 and is also at odds with the role of the United States
as the primary proponent of human rights and equal protection for
all individuals in today's global community. One of the obligations
of this role is that the United States is forced to ascertain the consti-
tutional limitations on the U.S. government when it acts abroad. In
the context of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has an-
nounced that there are no constitutional limitations to restrain the
U.S. government's actions abroad.
V. Potential Ramifications of Verdugo-Urguidez
One of the Court's concerns in Verdugo-Urquidez was that restrict-
ing the actions of the U.S. government in the search and seizure con-
text would have a deleterious effect on the foreign policy operations
of the United States.' 48 The Court cited the possible effects on mili-
tary operations abroad, and on the foreign policy functions of Con-
gress and the President.149
The situations the Court calls attention to are those that are or-
dinarily considered emergency situations. If there arose a search and
seizure question in such a situation, it would most likely fall under
the exigent circumstances exception and excuse the requirements of
the Fourth Amendment. Likewise, when the political branches con-
duct their foreign operations in such situations, their actions are
often reactions to emergency situations. Congress and the President
are well equipped with certain tools to handle such situations and
would not be unduly burdened by the application of the Fourth
Amendment to restrain the actions of federal officials acting abroad.
For example, the President may issue executive orders and the Sen-
ate has treaty ratification powers.
One of the potential ramifications of Verdugo-Urquidez is that the
Bill of Rights, or at least the Fourth Amendment, may become a cas-
ualty of the war on drugs. The United States is already witnessing
the beginning of this process as manifested in the form of the ran-
dom stopping of certain travellers on U.S. interstate highways. For
example, based on a "drug courier profile," the Florida highway pa-
trol is urged to stop a vehicle if, inter alia, the driver does not "fit the
vehicle" or if the driver is of an "ethnic group associated with the
drug trade."1 50
146 Note, supra note 52, at 653.
47 Henkin, supra note 98, at 1584.
148 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1066.
149 Id.
150 Wisotsky, supra note 4, at 915.
1990] 529
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
In the past, individuals whose Fourth Amendment rights had
been violated by overzealous law enforcement could seek relief from
the courts. But today, in light of Verdugo-Urquidez and the ever-in-
creasing U.S. drug crisis, and compounded by the fact that the inher-
ent intrusiveness of drug enforcement techniques conflicts with the
guarantees of the Fourth Amendment, there may be an unwilling-
ness on the part of courts to grant relief when such relief is due.
Moreover, because Verdugo-Urquidez was a notorious killer as
well as a reputed drug dealer,' 5 ' some courts may unwittingly inter-
pret Verdugo-Urquidez as an implicit endorsement of the theory of
comparative reprehensibility with respect to the Fourth Amend-
ment.' 5 2 Professor Kamisar, quoting Judge Robert Bork, explained
this principle:
Where defendant's conduct is more reprehensible than the police
officer's (as of course, it will usually be), the "judges shouldn't soil
their hands" argument is a good reason for admitting illegally seized
evidence. For "judges soil their hands" a good deal more by "turning a
criminal loose upon society" than they do by simply ignoring an of-
ficer's violation of the Fourth Amendment.... [A] judge ought to
lose a lot less sleep over admitting highly probative, albeit tainted,
evidence than she should over "freeing" an apparently guilty person
to "prey upon society" again. 153
This theory is in direct conflict with the Fourth Amendment and the
basic premise of U.S. criminal jurisprudence-a defendant is inno-
cent until proven guilty. 154 According to this theory, a presumption
of the accused's guilt justifies the admission of evidence obtained by
law enforcement officers who use means violative of the Fourth
Amendment.
VI. Conclusion
This brief overview of the precepts relevant to the extraterrito-
rial application of constitutional restrictions on the actions of the
U.S. government when acting upon aliens abroad clearly indicates
that there were no definitive signposts to guide the Verdugo-Urquidz
Court. Nevertheless, the Court has answered this previously unan-
swered, and seemingly unanswerable question. The Chief Justice
151 Id.
152 Kamisar, "Comparative Reprehensibility" and the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 86
MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1987).
153 Id. at 2.
154 As the Ninth Circuit observed in Verdugo-Urquidez:
If these allegations are proved true at trial, there is little doubt that
Verdugo-Urquidez's conduct has placed him beyond the pale of civilized so-
ciety. But in this country, a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
We would not permit a jury to discard this fundamental precept of criminal
law simply because the accused is charged with a serious crime. Likewise, we
will not allow ourselves to be swayed by the DEA's suspicions, no matter how
well founded ....
Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1215.
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separated his decision into six different parts; however there is one
common denominator in all of these parts-"the People."' 55 His
opinion has one dimension, which has been merely disguised and
reworded in six fashions. The crux of Chief Justice Rehnquist's ar-
gument is that because Verdugo-Urquidez is a nonresident alien, he
is not one of "the People," therefore he is not entitled to the protec-
tions of the Fourth Amendment. This is so despite the fact that he
faces trial in the United States for violations of U.S. laws while
abroad.
The Verdugo-Urquidez Court expressed some valid concerns, but
the Court's reasoning and analysis were one dimensional and did not
take into account the implications and ramifications of such a sweep-
ing decision. To mandate that a nonresident alien must abide by
U.S. laws that have extraterritorial reach, but then deny this same
alien the protections provided by U.S. jurisprudence when he is
haled into a U.S. court to answer for a violation of these extraterrito-
rial laws, is anomalous. As the Verdugo-Urquidez decision stands, the
Bill of Rights may be on its way down a slippery slope, with the
Fourth Amendment leading the way. The Supreme Court should
heed the concern voiced by the U.S. Court of Berlin in Tiede:
[I]f the .. .[U.S.] authorities may act free of all constitutional re-
straints no one.., has any protection from their untrammeled dis-
cretion. If there are no constitutional protections [for aliens], there
is no First Amendment, no Fifth Amendment or Sixth Amendment;
even the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of involuntary servi-
tude would be inapplicable. 156
Unfortunately the smuggling of narcotics into the United States has
already taken its toll in terms of the many U.S. lives lost and ruined.
However, the United States should not sacrifice the principles which
are at the heart of U.S. polity. The right to live in a free society that
guarantees due process and personal liberty is much too high a cost
to pay for winning the drug war.
EMMANUEL Kojo BENTIL
155 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1060-61, 1063-65.
156 United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227, 242-43 (1979).
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